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ABSTRACT 
Michel Foucault famously argued that punishment was an expression 
of power—a way for the State to shore up and legitimize its political 
authority. Foucault attributed the historical shift away from public torture 
and corporal punishment, which occurred during the 19th century, to the 
availability of new techniques of social control; however, corporal and 
capital punishment (what we term “shock punishment”) persists in many 
penal systems to this day, suggesting that these countries have for some 
reason not fully undergone this penal evolution. Using the experiences of 
Hong Kong and Singapore as case studies, we attempt to explain why this 
is the case.  
We argue that, while a range of factors contribute to why countries 
employ shock punishment, retention is often linked to the political stability 
of a government’s rule. Punishment, as a visceral expression of power, 
makes shock punishment particularly appealing to States grappling with 
political insecurity. In the post-war period, Hong Kong’s colonial 
government did not feel their rule challenged to the same extent as the 
newly independent government in Singapore. The result is two radically 
divergent stories with regards to corporal punishment, with Hong Kong 
abolishing the practice altogether in 1991 and Singapore not only 
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retaining it, but greatly expanding its usage. As further support for our 
thesis, we offer empirical data regarding the use of shock punishment and 
the political freedom of the societies that retain it. We identify a fairly 
robust, positive correlation between the use of shock punishment and 
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governments desperate to legitimize 
their rule. The final conclusion we reach is that, while many factors 
undoubtedly contribute to the retention of shock punishment, its expressive 
power plays a significant role in why many States continue to employ it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, an American teenager, Michael Fay, was convicted of theft 
and vandalism in a Singaporean Court and sentenced to six lashes with a 
moistened rattan cane.
1
 For many Westerners, the ensuing media circus 
and international attention Fay’s plight attracted brought to light a practice 
that had long been abolished in many Western jurisdictions—that of 
judicial corporal punishment. Indeed, the past two centuries have seen a 
dramatic shift away from physical harm in the punishment of criminals 
toward a more rehabilitative approach.
2
 Yet, despite this development, 
corporal punishment endures well into the modern era.
3
 Indeed, most 
Westerners would be utterly shocked at how common whipping, beating, 
caning, and even wounding and amputation are as forms of sentencing in 
many penal systems. The penal evolution away from corporal and capital 
punishment to the penitentiary system that began in Europe and the United 
States around the end of the 18th century is examined in detail in Michel 
Foucault’s seminal work, Discipline and Punish.4 Foucault attributes these 
prison reform movements not to an increase in humanitarian concern but 
to the availability of new mechanisms of social control. For Foucault, 
punishment is an expression of power—the highly ritualized ceremonies 
that accompanied corporal and capital punishment were a conduit through 
which the State communicated and thereby reinforced the legitimacy of its 
rule. The political function of this kind of shock punishment (a term we 
use henceforth to describe both corporal and capital punishment) continues 
to play an influential role in its retention.
5
 Indeed, to understand why these 
forms of punishment doggedly persist into the modern age, their powerful 
expressive nature must be taken into account.  
The thesis this Article proposes is this: there is a link between the 
retention of shock punishment and the perceived legitimacy of a 
 
 
 1. Philip Shenon, Singapore Journal; A Flogging Sentence Brings a Cry of Pain in U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 16, 1994). Fay’s sentence of six lashes was eventually reduced to four after official U.S. 
requests for judicial leniency. CYNDI BANKS, PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 
139 (2005). 
 2. See KATHLEEN AUERHAHN, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: EVALUATING 
CALIFORNIA’S IMPRISONMENT CRISIS 23–25 (2012). 
 3. Henceforth, where the term corporal punishment is used, it is meant to connote judicial 
corporal punishment.  
 4. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT (1979). 
 5. The term “shock punishment” should not be construed as a comment on retributivism as a 
theory of punishment. That is to say, it is not to imply that the only use of these forms of punishment is 
to shock. Yet this shock value cannot be denied. Thus, out of expository convenience, the term shock 
punishment is employed because it accurately captures the effect of both of these visceral forms of 
punishment. 
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government’s rule. Governments that feel their authority is threatened find 
shock punishment’s expressive power appealing in the face of political 
insecurity. Thus, authoritarian and semi-authoritarian States consistently 
tend to employ shock punishment. This is nothing new. Throughout 
history, monarchs and tyrants strove to fortify the legitimacy of their rule 
through appeals to such things as divine right and natural law—shock 
punishment has always been another tool by which to bolster their power, 
one readily used. In the modern era, political legitimacy typically comes in 
the form of liberal democracy and the electoral mandate the ballot 
provides. As such, liberal democracies simply do not need to resort to 
shock punishment to shore up the legitimacy of their rule. Such 
governments have no use for what we may call the theatre of punishment. 
With political liberalism the role of shock punishment as a means to 
express power becomes less significant. 
It is important, however, to clarify what we are not arguing. First, we 
are not arguing that shock punishment tends to persist in non-democratic 
States because the public is unable to voice its rejection of it.
6
 Our 
argument is more nuanced: the democratic State does not feel the 
legitimacy of its rule is in question, and so is naturally less invested in the 
retention of shock punishment. Second, we are not arguing that all 
countries that retain shock punishment do so merely to shore up their 
political authority. There are many factors that contribute to the retention 
of shock punishment. These range from colonization, to religion, fear of 
crime, a lack of effective policing, a belief in its deterrent value, or a 
simple normative commitment to retribution. Rather, our argument is that 
the semiotics of punishment is one of many contributing factors, but, as 
we argue, quite often a significant one. Lastly, we are not contending that 
all States that employ shock punishment are “unfree;” rather, we are 
pointing out—and this is an important point—that the vast majority of 
unfree States employ shock punishment.
7
 Finally, implicit in our approach 
is the assumption that the political legitimacy of authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian States is typically more open to question than that of liberal 
democracies. While some may contest this point we feel it is, for the most 
part, a reasonable assumption. 
 
 
 6. The ability of the public to shape public policy has not shown itself to be a critical factor in 
abolition. Indeed, abolition in Europe occurred in the face of popular support for it. See ROBERT 
BLECKER, THE DEATH OF PUNISHMENT: SEARCHING FOR JUSTICE AMONG THE WORST OF THE WORST 
276 (2013). 
 7. See infra table 7. 
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To support our thesis, we first examine the use of shock punishment in 
Hong Kong and Singapore. For our purposes, Hong Kong and Singapore 
are perfect cases studies: both are former British Crown colonies; both are 
small, East Asian city-states;
8
 both inherited the English Common Law; 
both are highly developed capitalist economies; they are comparable in 
both geographic size and size of population; and they are demographically 
both predominantly Chinese.
9
 Despite these similarities, they followed 
radically different trajectories with regards to the retention of judicial 
corporal punishment in the decades after the Second World War, with 
Hong Kong finally abolishing the practice in 1989 and Singapore actually 
greatly expanding its usage.
10
 A salient difference between these two 
former British colonies is the sense of political legitimacy enjoyed by their 
respective governments. This, we argue, largely accounts for why Hong 
Kong eventually abolished shock punishment while Singapore has 
retained it. Governments whose authority is besieged are not eager to 
discard the expressive power that shock punishment delivers. 
There are various theories that seek to explain the penal evolution away 
from shock punishment. There is one we might associate with the Marxist 
tradition, which posits that as economies advance, becoming more 
affluent, elites no longer need to rely as much on terror to control the 
population.
11
 Another perspective, very much associated with Emile 
Durkheim, argues that as societies shift from religious and collectivist 
values to individualism and the rule of law, shock punishment conflicts 
with those values.
12
 We are not dismissing these theories; rather, we are 
simply highlighting the semiotic function of shock punishment as an 
alternative or, perhaps, as an explanation. We develop our argument in 
three parts. Part I discusses Foucault’s thinking in more detail and the 
penal transition he describes. Part II then examines the use of corporal 
 
 
 8. The term “State” is used here somewhat loosely. Since 1997, Hong Kong has officially been 
a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. However, because shock 
punishment was abolished in Hong Kong before the Handover, our analysis with respect to Hong 
Kong is limited to before its return to the PRC. 
 9. Comparing the penal practices of Hong Kong and Singapore is not without precedent 
precisely because they are so ideally suited to the task. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan et al., Executions, 
Deterrence, and Homicide: A Tale of Two Cities, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2010). 
 10. See WING HONG CHUI, T. WING LO, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN HONG KONG 9 
(2013). For the case of Singapore, see infra note 113 and accompany text. 
 11. See Jonathan Simon, Mass incarceration: From Social Policy to Social Problem, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 40 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 
2012) (citing scholarship that argues that the transition towards mass incarceration as the prevailing 
form of punishment may be attributed to shifting economic conditions). 
 12. Id. at 43 (referencing as distinctly Durkheimian the position that this penal evolution 
occurred as a result of a conflict in societal values). 
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punishment in Hong Kong and Singapore, arguing that the issue of 
political legitimacy helped shaped their relationship with corporal 
punishment. Part III then explores empirical data regarding the global use 
of corporal and capital punishment (with an emphasis on capital 
punishment) in relation to the political and social freedom of the societies 
that retain it. We identify a fairly robust, positive correlation between the 
use of shock punishment and authoritarian and semi-authoritarian 
governments. Of course, correlation is not causation; however, the 
consistency of this finding provides a substantial degree of credibility to 
the thesis that the political function of shock punishment plays a role in its 
retention. The final conclusion we reach is that, while many factors 
contribute to the retention of shock punishment, its expressive power plays 
a role in why States continue to employ these forms of punishment. 
I. THE “SPECTACLE OF THE SCAFFOLD” 
A. Punishment as Political Marketing 
To truly appreciate Foucault’s thinking, we need to consider the 
historical use of punishment. Public displays of corporal punishment have 
featured prominently in penal history.
13
 The communicative quality of 
shock punishment has served a distinctly political function.
14
 These public 
displays of punishment, the more savage the better, possessed an 
unmistakeable mass marketing component. With typical literary flair, 
Foucault referred to this as the ‘spectacle of the scaffold.’15 Indeed, 
spectacle is a fitting description. To properly appreciate this, it is useful to 
consider how punishment was historically employed. In England, for 
example, the spiked heads of murderers and traitors were displayed for the 
public on the gate of London Bridge, a practice dating back to the early 
14th century.
16
 In their use of crucifixion as a means of execution, the 
 
 
 13. JASON PHILIP COY, STRANGERS AND MISFITS: BANISHMENT, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND 
AUTHORITY IN EARLY MODERN GERMANY 8 (2008).  
 14. This communicative aspect should not be confused with the literature on the expressive 
power of punishment—that is judicial punishment’s capacity to signal a collective moral sentiment. 
For examples of this literature, see Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 
83 VA. L. REV. 349, 354–56 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 943 (1995). This communicative aspect of punishment should also not be confused with the 
work of Anthony Duff, who argues that criminal punishment is a vital mode of moral communication 
and thus a normative justification for punishment. Our project here is not normative—it is entirely 
descriptive.  
 15. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 32–72. 
 16. JOHN A. NAGY, REBELLION IN THE RANKS: MUTINIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 99 
(2007). 
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Romans in their brutal efficiency literally turned the condemned into 
billboards heralding the power of the Empire.
17
 The Romans often 
strategically placed crucifixion sites at busy thoroughfares to amplify this 
effect.
18
 The macabre shock value of crucifixion was perhaps rivalled by 
the English technique of having the offender hanged, drawn and quartered, 
where the condemned was publically strung up to the point of death, 
disembowelled, then cut into four pieces (a punishment reserved for high 
treason).
19
 The gibbet served a comparable marketing function, with the 
offender typically left to swing upon the scaffold in public view for days.
20
 
In 18th century England, bodies “remained on the gibbet for weeks or 
months, sometimes until the bones became weathered and brittle and 
collapsed.”21 Britain’s Murder Act of 1752 allowed the bodies of those 
convicted of serious misdemeanours to be hung by a chain.
22
 Authorities 
would often douse the body in tar to protect it from the elements and 
thereby preserve it for public viewing.
23
 
Punishment was meted out in the form of elaborate, almost theatrical, 
performances carried out in public that incorporated “a profusion of 
formulaic, ritualized elements.”24 Public hangings, beheadings, and 
expulsion ceremonies “were elaborate performances intended to display 
communal norms as well as power relations.”25 Indeed, public executions 
were stagecraft that any modern marketing agent would applaud. The 
condemned was brought before the crowd in a carnival-like atmosphere, 
where he or she was subjected to jeers and public condemnation in a well-
choreographed re-affirmation of the community’s normative standards.26 
Non-lethal public punishments “communicated the offender’s crime to the 
watching crowd, and via gossip, to the entire community.”27 Punishments, 
such as whipping at “the cart’s tail” where offenders were fastened to a 
cart and led through busy thoroughfares while being whipped, were 
 
 
 17. See MARTIN HENGEL, CRUCIFIXION IN THE ANCIENT WORLD AND THE FOLLY OF THE 
MESSAGE OF THE CROSS 50 (1977) (for the deterrent function of crucifixion). Crucifixion was widely 
employed in the ancient world: crucifixion was common among the Persians, the Greeks, the 
Assyrians, the Scythians, the Taurians, the Celts, the Germani, and the Britanni. See id. at 22–23. 
 18. ALISTER E. MCGRATH, CHRISTIANITY: AN INTRODUCTION 22 (2006). 
 19. JEAN KELLAWAY, THE HISTORY OF TORTURE AND EXECUTION 50 (2003). 
 20. SHULAMITH SHAHAR, WOMEN IN A MEDIEVAL HERETICAL SECT: AGNES AND HUGUETTE 
THE WALDENSIANS 114 (2001). 
 21. KELLAWAY, supra note 19, at 53. 
 22. Id. at 52. 
 23. Id. at 53. 
 24. See COY, supra note 13. 
 25. Id. 
 26. ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 103 (2002). 
 27. Id. at 104. 
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designed to achieve maximum public exposure.
28
 Other practices, such as 
“riding the stang” and the “scold’s bridle” also involved parading the 
offender through busy streets advertising their crime.
29
  
Public participation often played a crucial role in the marketing 
strategy of punishment, reinforcing the impression that the fate of the 
punished represented the collective sentiment of society and widespread 
support for the State.
30
 This was an expression of implied public support 
for the authority structure of the State—a tacit acknowledgment of its 
legitimacy. The pillory where the offender was physically restrained in a 
public venue is a great example of the marketing component of corporal 
punishment. Pillories were usually placed on high platforms to ensure 
maximum exposure and typically used during lunch hours when the streets 
were at their busiest.
31
 To draw a large crowd, music was sometimes 
played as the offender was marched to the pillory.
32
 The malefactor was 
restrained within the pillory beneath a written notice of his or her crime
33
 
as the crowd pelted the offender with excrement, mud, rotten fruit, eggs, 
entrails of slaughtered animals, and other unsavoury objects.
34
 Similarly, 
whipping audiences also participated in the punishment: “the severity with 
which the executioner wielded his whip depended on how loud the 
observers shouted.”35 Indeed, “the publicity of whipping was clearly meant 
to influence the crowd as much as it did the convict.”36 Public participation 
confirmed the legitimacy of both the ceremony of punishment and the 
State that administered it. 
Public shaming is usually thought of in terms of retributive justice or 
deterrence; however, parading the offender before the public was also a 
potent expression of State power. While we are conditioned to view the 
condemned as the target of the act, in truth the primary target for these 
rituals was the public. The State utilized normative deviance as an 
opportunity to express its power. In this sense, the offender’s punishment 
 
 
 28. ROBERT BRINK SHOEMAKER, THE LONDON MOB: VIOLENCE AND DISORDER IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND 79, 81–82 (2007). 
 29. DANIEL DIEHL, MARK P. DONNELLY, THE BIG BOOK OF PAIN: TORTURE & PUNISHMENT 
THROUGH HISTORY 200 (2009). 
 30. SHOEMAKER, supra note 28, at 79. 
 31. KELLAWAY, supra note 19, at 64. 
 32. ARDIS BUTTERFIELD, CHAUCER AND THE CITY 136 (2006). 
 33. Id. 
 34. SHOEMAKER, supra note 28, at 84. See also ANDREW TODD HARRIS, POLICING THE CITY: 
CRIME AND LEGAL AUTHORITY IN LONDON, 1780–1840 61 (2004); IAN MORGAN, OLDE 
NOTTINGHAMSHIRE PUNISHMENTS 20 (2012).  
 35. Id. 
 36. SHOEMAKER, supra note 28, at 79, 84. 
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was (and indeed still is) an important medium of communication. There is 
a marketing function of the “spectacle of scaffold” and it helps explain 
why it took the form it did.  
B. Punishment in Transition 
The West’s transition from corporal punishment and other torture 
techniques to a more reform-oriented, rehabilitative approach to 
punishment is a point of fascination for Foucault. Opening with a brutally 
graphic description of the 1757 torture and execution of Robert-Francois 
Damiens (who had been convicted of attempted regicide), Foucault 
proceeds to contrast this graphic event with a description of the 
regimented, reformative prison life that came into fashion in the 19th 
century with the use of prisons becoming more widespread.
37
 Foucault 
explores the historical shift away from what he calls a “culture of 
spectacle,”—a penal system based upon shock punishment—to a system 
where punishment and discipline are internalized and woven into the 
social institutions through which the character of modern man is shaped—
what Foucault understands as a “carceral culture.”38  
1. The Birth of the Prison and the Semiotics of Power 
The carceral culture represents an evolving system of subjugation. 
According to Foucault, it is a more sophisticated technique of social 
subjugation.
39
 In describing the carceral culture, Foucault employs Jeremy 
Bentham’s famous Panopticon—a prison designed in such a way that 
inmates are visible at all times to a central watchtower, but cannot 
themselves tell if they are actually being watched at any given time.
40
 The 
result is a system where inmates discipline themselves and order is 
achieved without the need for brutal forms of physical punishment. 
Foucault employs the image of the Panopticon as a chilling metaphor for 
the carceral culture.
41
 Foucault applies this model at the societal level, 
where people are disciplined into policing themselves into prescribed 
normalcy through various institutions, such as schools, administrative 
 
 
 37. See Parts 1 & 2, FOUCAULT, supra note 4. 
 38. DEBORAH BROCK, AMANDA GLASBEEK, CARMELA MURDOCCA, CRIMINALIZATION, 
REPRESENTATION, REGULATION: THINKING DIFFERENTLY ABOUT CRIME 17 (2014). 
 39. See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 4. 
 40. BROCK, supra note 38, at 17–19. 
 41. Id.  
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bureaucracies, and particularly the family.
42
 Modern society, Foucault 
argues, is one marked by these institutionalized systems of discipline and 
control. It is a panoptic society.  
For Foucault, the State was the primary beneficiary of shock 
punishment. Such theatrical displays had a distinctly socio-political 
function. Foucault opined, “[t]he public execution is to be understood not 
only as a judicial, but also as a political ritual. It belongs, even in minor 
cases, to the ceremonies by which power is manifested.”43 Foucault sees 
the body of the condemned as a graphic display of State authority and the 
brutal subjugation of anyone who would defy that authority. He argues 
that such displays of brutality were used to achieve very specific effects, 
not just in regards to crime suppression but also with respect to political 
ends. The elaborate ceremony of corporal punishment was a drama 
designed to promote the idea of the State’s majesty and its absolute 
authority in deciding the fate of the individual, displayed and acted out in 
the most brutal and impactful manner. Such “performances” underscored 
the intense asymmetry between the power of the individual and the power 
of the State. Indeed, judicial torture viscerally displayed the sublime 
power of the State upon the body of the offender. The carefully 
choreographed ceremony of punishment, as Foucault calls it, was a 
powerful semiotic tool.
44
 In an age saturated and awash with images of 
simulated brutality, it is difficult to appreciate how unique an opportunity 
punishment was for the State. There were few things in ages past that 
could rival the graphic force of taking a body, turning it inside out, using 
its fluids, its pain and its convulsions to create a three dimensional 
experience for the audience. It was a vivid performance and the physical 
pain of the offender played a critical role in the theatre of punishment. 
Indeed, the ceremony of punishment was a precious marketing opportunity 
for the State: it combined religious, military, and political authority in a 
dramatically visceral event that could be repeatedly performed. 
Of course, a core purpose of these public displays of punishment was 
simple deterrence. Foucault’s genealogy of punishment does not dismiss 
this: “men will remember public exhibition, the pillory, torture and pain 
duly observed.”45 But this is a limited understanding of deterrence. Our 
conception of deterrence should be expanded beyond the mere deterrence 
of crime. What is captured in a broader conception of deterrence is that 
 
 
 42. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 216.  
 43. Id. at 47. 
 44. See generally id. 
 45. Id. at 34. 
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judicial punishment deters individuals from challenging the authority of 
the State itself. It shores up, cements, and legitimizes the State’s political 
authority—sanctifying its position of supremacy over the individual. 
Through the medium of punishment, the State wins tacit 
acknowledgement as the rightful administrator of punishment—the 
ultimate expression of domination over the individual. When this comes in 
the form of corporeal punishment, this messaging component is 
heightened. It is underscored with the sting of the whip or the bruising of 
the cane. Indeed, it is literally the State ‘beating’ the citizen child into 
submission—a primal and unmistakable expression of dominance. This 
effect is even more intense in the case of judicial execution. It is telling 
that, upon seizing political power, new regimes so often engage in mass 
public executions as way to solidify their fledgling authority. The 
Revolutionary Tribunal in the French revolution, the Bolsheviks in Russia, 
the communist revolution in China—these are but a handful of examples. 
Foucault argues that “in the ceremonies of the public execution, the main 
character was the people, whose real and immediate presence was required 
for the performance.”46 Indeed, in these ritualized ceremonies, the public 
punishment of the condemned was far less about the offender and more 
about those who witnessed it. Shock punishment is primal, visceral, and 
unsophisticated. But this is exactly why it is such an effective means of 
communication and social control. 
2. Extending Foucault’s Model 
Effective but not ideal, Foucault highlights the drawbacks inherent in 
shock punishment. He argues that the social disturbances that often 
accompanied public punishment such as riots, often in support of the 
condemned, were a threat to the State.
47
 The ceremony of shock 
punishment often backfired, becoming an occasion for the public to 
express their collective dissatisfaction with the power structure. Thus, 
Foucault argues, the availability of new “technologies of power” that 
allowed for more sophisticated and pervasive techniques of social control 
and discipline were adopted by the State.
48
 The prison was an archetype of 
this but it was equally manifest in other institutions of social 
regimentation—lunatic asylums, schools, factories, workhouses, army 
 
 
 46. Id. at 57. 
 47. See BARRY SMART & MICHEL FOUCAULT: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 76 (2002). 
 48. See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 4. 
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barracks, and hospitals.
49
 All represented a new architecture of social 
control; however, Foucault’s account does not adequately explain why 
shock punishment stubbornly persists to this day (albeit in a highly 
moderated fashion) in societies around the world that have fully developed 
these technologies of power. That is, it is not clear why some States have 
not fully transitioned away from a culture of spectacle.  
These States usually sanitize the brutality of shock punishment, often 
shielding the public from directly witnessing the act, or adopting less 
macabre techniques of execution such as lethal injection. Even with these 
modifications, the communicative power of shock punishment is still 
deftly harnessed in that a population knows full well that citizens who 
defy the law are subject to the lash of the whip or the judiciary’s noose. In 
some countries executions are not even performed out of public view. In 
fact, public exposure is maximized. Saudi Arabia, for example, performs 
public floggings and beheadings on a regular basis: “the condemned are 
beheaded, normally on Fridays, in one of the main squares in Riyadh, at 
the rate of about one a week.”50 Executions before large crowds also occur 
in Iran, China, North Korea, and Thailand.
51
 In the case of China, during 
one prominent anti-crime campaign
52
 in 2001 there were nationwide mass 
sentencing rallies,
53
 held in public sports stadiums, market places, schools, 
factories, and community halls.
54
 More recently, China seems to have 
moved away from these public spectacles;
55
 however, the case of 
Singapore is particularly interesting: the inability of Foucault’s model to 
map onto the example of Singapore—a highly modern, economically 
advanced State with all the trappings of a carceral state—suggests that 
there is a catalyst that we are missing.  
 
 
 49. NICK CROSSLEY, REFLEXIVE EMBODIMENT IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: THE BODY IN 
LATE MODERN SOCIETY 40 (2006). 
 50. GARRETT G. FAGAN, THE LURE OF THE ARENA: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CROWD AT 
THE ROMAN GAMES 69 (2011). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Beginning in the 1980s the Chinese government launched periodic anti-crime campaigns that 
target specific crimes such as drug trafficking, known as Yanda, or “strike hard.” Public sentencing 
events play a key role in such campaigns. Susan Trevaskes, Public Sentencing Rallies In China: The 
Symbolizing of Punishment and Justice in a Socialist State, 39 CRIME, LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 359, 
363 (2003). See also LENA ZHONG, COMMUNITIES, CRIME SOCIAL CAPITAL IN CONTEMPORARY 
CHINA 138 (2013).  
 53. Susan Trevaskes, Public Sentencing Rallies in China: The Symbolizing of Punishment and 
Justice in a Socialist State, 39 CRIME, LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 359, 372 (2003). 
 54. Id. at 361, 374. 
 55. See SUSAN TREVASKES, THE DEATH PENALTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 162–63 (2012); 
KAM C. WONG, POLICE REFORM IN CHINA 62 (2011). 
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Our point is that shock punishment, if properly modulated, is still 
useful to States that feel the need to shore up their political legitimacy. 
Thus it is not surprising that we see the persistence of shock punishment in 
a softened form—enough to still harness the benefits of shock punishment 
while mitigating its hazards. There is a cost-benefit aspect to the use of 
shock punishment. If handled correctly, employing shock punishment may 
still provide a net benefit for States compelled to utilize all available 
mechanisms to project power; however, for a politically secure State not 
desperate to shore up its legitimacy, shock punishment does not provide 
any net benefit—it provides only net negatives. Thus, a critical factor 
regarding the use of shock punishment is how secure a government feels 
with respect to its rule. We argue that the rise of pluralistic democracy was 
the primary impetus for the penal transition from a culture of spectacle to a 
carceral culture, not because it gave voice to a public hunger for penal 
change (indeed, in many abolitionist countries there was in fact 
overwhelming majority support for judicial execution),
56
 but because 
democratically-elected governments feel more secure in the legitimacy of 
their rule and thus no longer have a pressing need to compensate by 
employing such unsophisticated “marketing” tactics. It should not be 
surprising, therefore, that the Western abandonment of shock punishment 
more or less coincided with the rise of pluralistic democracies. 
Governments already legitimized by the ballot are susceptible to policy 
capture by well-organized reformers pressing to abolish shock 
punishment, even if these reformers represent a minority. Indeed, this was 
very much the European experience: abolition was an “elite-driven 
enterprise” that was pushed through in spite of popular sentiment.57  
C. An Incomplete Transition: Hong Kong and Singapore 
Indeed, the shift in punishment Foucault describes is somewhat murky 
when one considers the continued use of corporal punishment in places 
such as Hong Kong and Singapore well into recent times. The process of 
abolition in Hong Kong unfolded far more slowly, and with regards to 
 
 
 56. In the case of abolition of the death penalty, the following examples illustrate this point:  
when France abolished the death penalty in 1981, 62% of the French public supported 
retention; in 1975, eleven years after the UK ended common applications of judicial 
execution, 82% of the public wanted to restore it; in Italy, France, and Sweden, attitudes tend 
to be more or less evenly split.  
See THOMAS S. MOWLE, ALLIES AT ODDS?: THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 107 
(2004). 
 57. Id. 
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Singapore, shock punishment has not been abandoned at all, and in fact 
does not appear to be going anywhere. Granted, the techniques employed 
in caning obviously in no way approach the level of brutality seen in 18th 
Century France, yet the fact remains that the central purpose of caning is 
the infliction of physical pain on the subject and crucially, as we argue, the 
expression of power. The fact that the use of caning increased almost 
exponentially in Singapore in the decades since independence would seem 
to go against Foucault’s model. We would expect to find a panoptic 
society in modern-day Singapore. Yet that is not what we find at all. The 
Panopticon is certainly present in the case of Singapore. In fact, the power 
of the State is pervasive and in many ways Singapore is a model panoptic 
society. It is a modern, economically developed nation with all the 
technologies of power firmly in place—yet both corporal and capital 
punishment remain and are extensively utilized.  
For Britain, the use of corporal punishment had for centuries been an 
ingrained part of British culture, often associated with stern schoolmasters 
and misbehaving pupils
58
 in addition to its use in judicial settings.
59
 Its use 
as a legal tool of English judicial justice can be traced to the Whipping 
Act, passed in 1530 by Henry VIII, which stipulated that vagrants be 
publicly stripped and whipped “till the body be bloody by such 
whipping.”60 Corporal punishment was a means for States of the era, 
including England, to consolidate control over their populations; since the 
States were relatively weak and had only small numbers of personnel at 
their disposal, the “violence that could be deployed by [these] minimalist 
states” played a key role in exercising that control.61 Prisons of the era 
were not seen as places for rehabilitating offenders, but as holding 
facilities where convicts would await their sentences to be carried out 
(whether corporal or capital in nature).
62
 As already explained, change 
finally came in the late 18th and 19th centuries, when new schools of 
thought emerged advocating regimented daily routines designed to reform 
prisoners; the results would yield many new and innovative designs, 
 
 
 58. Corporal punishment in schools is not a focus of this writing, but it is worth pointing out that 
while its use in judicial or prison-related functions lingered in Britain well into the 1940s and 1960s 
respectively, it would remain a fixture in schools for even longer. Its use in British schools, for 
example, was only banned as recently as 1999. BBC Timeshift: Crime and Punishment—The Story of 
Corporal Punishment (BBC television broadcast Apr. 4, 2011) 
 59. Id. 
 60. MATTHEW PATE & LAURIE A. GOULD, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AROUND THE WORLD 31 
(2012). 
 61. BBC Timeshift, supra note 58. 
 62. Id.; DAVID TAYLOR, CRIME, POLICING AND PUNISHMENT IN ENGLAND, 1750–1914 145 
(1998). 
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including Bentham’s Panopticon.63 While, again, prison design would 
progress greatly by the 19th century and with it a focus on reforming the 
offender, the use of corporal punishment would continue in Britain long 
after most of Europe had abolished it.
64
 Thus, by the time Britain became 
the center of a large, global empire, corporal punishment in public, 
whether it be convicts in pillories or public floggings, was an entrenched 
aspect of criminal punishment and had been exported to colonies 
throughout the Empire. 
While Foucault’s theory of punishment is complex, for our purposes, 
the question is a simple one: why do some modern penal systems still 
maintain and employ techniques drawn from the culture of spectacle, the 
era of penal punishment that used the offender’s body as a conduit to 
express the commanding power of the State? In the case of Hong Kong 
and Singapore, why has one former British colony divested itself of all 
vestiges of the culture of spectacle while the other has felt compelled to 
retain it? Indeed, the culture of spectacle very much survives in Singapore 
in a residual, muted form. 
II. THE CASE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN HONG KONG 
Understanding the political function of corporal punishment, it makes 
sense that, even well past its decline in the United Kingdom, the British 
Empire continued to employ judicial corporal punishment in their colonial 
holdings—for it was here that their authority and the legitimacy of their 
rule was most open to local challenge. Indeed, the progressive changes 
mentioned above were very slow to find their way into the colonies, and 
when they did arrive, their implementation was equally slow. Approaches 
to corrections and punishment in Hong Kong evolved with time, often 
reflecting similar changes in Britain, only further delayed. For instance, 
upon the construction of Hong Kong’s first prison in 1841 (one of the first 
permanent Western structures built in the colony), European prisoners 
were afforded markedly better treatment.
65
 The reasoning behind this was 
to better facilitate self-reflection and hopefully encourage the offender to 
mend his ways, in accordance with the latest penal attitudes in Britain and 
 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. See FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 10.  
 65. Frank Dikötter, ‘A paradise for rascals’: Colonialism, punishment and the prison in Hong 
Kong (1841–1898), in ‘THE ULTIMATE MASTERS OF THE CITY’: POLICE, PUBLIC ORDER AND THE 
POOR IN COLONIAL BOMBAY, C. 1893–1914 50 (Prashant Kidambi ed., 2004). 
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elsewhere in Europe;
66
 however, the situation was markedly different in 
the lower levels where ethnic Chinese prisoners were kept. Viewed as 
inferior to their European counterparts, and thus incapable or unworthy of 
such an opportunity to reflect, a harsher, more severe punishment was 
enforced and all prisoners were kept in a large, common cell.
67
 The 
prevailing attitude among the British of the era was that “the Chinese were 
not deterred from crimes by ‘lenient’ British criminal justice.”68 This 
mentality was extended to corporal punishment, which was at that time a 
sentenced carried out on the Chinese publicly. Indeed, public floggings 
were a daily event in the early decades of British rule, with as many as 50 
public floggings in a single day being commonplace, usually arbitrarily 
and without due process.
69
 By contrast, European expatriate members of 
the colony were accorded the benefit of proper hearings and trials at the 
Supreme Court.
70
 Judicial punishment in early Colonial Hong Kong 
reflected a delayed importation of the shifts in criminal punishment that 
Europe had experienced, which Foucault writes of in Discipline and 
Punish. With respect to corporal punishment, however, the practice would 
continue for well over a century.  
A. A Slow Period of Change 
The period following the Second World War saw the first concrete 
efforts at abolishing corporal punishment in Hong Kong. An evolving 
view on human rights in the sphere of public international law would be 
one of the key sources of the change. In the immediate aftermath of World 
War II, the Western powers, including the United Kingdom, began placing 
a greater emphasis on the subject of human rights in their rhetoric. Indeed, 
the carnage and destructive scale of the war prompted a concerted effort 
by these powers to gain some type of international consensus to codify the 
protection of human rights, as well as further the cause for international 
peace.
71
 This resulted in the formation of the United Nations, which 
superseded the League of Nations, as well as the signing and ratification of 
 
 
 66. HONG KONG CORRECTIONAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, CUSTODY AND CORRECTION: 
DEVELOPMENT OF HONG KONG’S PENAL SYSTEM 15 (Sau-ching Au Yeung & Jeffrey Chow eds., 
2011). 
 67. Id. 
 68. STEVE TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 47 (2004). 
 69. Id. at 48. 
 70. Id.  
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several notable rights-related treaties.
72
 Among the most notable of these 
treaties to come into force was the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1976, seen by many as “the most juridically 
significant of all human rights instruments in the United Nations 
System.”73 Article 7 of the ICCPR provides that “no-one shall be subjected 
to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”, and in 
Hong Kong, the ICCPR was to take effect through the implementation of 
the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383), and later after 1997, 
Article 19 of the Basic Law.
74
 This, along with concurrent developments 
in Hong Kong itself, discussed below, would finally signal the end of 
corporal punishment in the Colony.  
Though an end to caning was in sight for Hong Kong in the years after 
the war, it would still be decades before abolition finally arrived. Not long 
after the United Kingdom abolished corporal punishment in 1948, the 
British Government decided to likewise abolish it in all of its Crown 
Colonies, although special deference would be given to the local 
circumstances of each colony.
75
 At this time, Hong Kong still employed 
caning with a high degree of frequency, but even then its use was 
beginning to decline. For example, in 1950, Hong Kong reported 405 
cases of judicial corporal punishment, the second highest among the 
colonies of the entire British Empire, behind only Nigeria.
76
 This was, 
however, still a dramatic drop from the previous year’s 4,367 floggings.77 
These last decades of British rule in Hong Kong saw numerous 
progressive advances in economic and social development in Hong Kong, 
with major improvements made to infrastructure, housing, social services, 
an overall rise in the standard of living, as well as a comprehensive 
reduction in government corruption;
78
 however, where corporal 
punishment was concerned, the era also reflected a State unwilling to 
release its hold on punishing the bodies of convicts. While a greater degree 
of socio-political stability was setting in, Hong Kong was not without its 
incidents of social unrest. For example, a series of public riots triggered by 
different events shook the colony in the post-war period, in 1956, 1966, 
 
 
 72. PEU GHOSH, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 224 (2013). 
 73. HALL, supra note 71, at 628. 
 74. Id. 
 75. UK PARLIAMENT, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN HONG KONG, HOUSE OF LORDS DEBATE, 
AUGUST 1 (1951). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., JOHN MARK CARROLL, A CONCISE HISTORY OF HONG KONG 172–76 (2007) 
(detailing anti-corruption efforts in the colony). 
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1967, and 1981.
79
 Quite likely, these incidents made the colonial 
government less inclined to abandon their use of shock punishment. As 
justification for its continued retention of shock punishment during this 
period, the colonial government argued that there was an unwillingness of 
the native Chinese population to adopt the lenient rehabilitative measures 
employed in Britain and elsewhere in the West.
80 
 
A Report by a Government Committee set up to examine the use of 
corporal punishment in the Colony in 1966 was one of Hong Kong’s first 
serious public discussions on the practice and its merits.
81
 Citing studies 
conducted by the Hong Kong Government as well as the Government of 
the United Kingdom, the Report recognized the importance of retaining a 
punitive element in even reformative forms of punishment, but cast doubt 
on whether corporal punishment alone, a purely retributive form of 
punishment, could be effective if there was no other point to it other than 
deterrence. The Report found:  
No form of punishment should be retained merely on retributive 
grounds. Therefore corporal punishment, which is retributive, 
cannot be justified unless it possesses some other attribute. It is 
certainly not reformative, but it is punitive, and as such may have 
some value as a deterrent. As a penalty containing no element of 
reform, corporal punishment can only be justified if we are satisfied 
that is deterrent value is greater than that of any other form of 
punishment, which carries an element of reform.
82
 
Indeed, it would appear that the “slackening of the hold” on the body that 
had ended for so many jurisdictions in Europe a century earlier, had begun 
to occur in Hong Kong, stopping just short of a full repeal.
83
 While the 
Report supported the idea of a complete abolition of caning, it curiously 
also added that because the public would oppose complete abolition, that 
there be a three year trial run instead.
84
  
The Report also asserted that a good deal of the public’s support for 
corporal punishment was based on inaccurate notions of its effectiveness 
 
 
 79. For a precise chronology of these incidences, as well as other major events in the history of 
colonial Hong Kong, see MING K. CHAN, PRECARIOUS BALANCE: HONG KONG BETWEEN CHINA AND 
BRITAIN, 184–1992, 1999–214 (1994). 
 80. See generally S. YOUNG (GOVERNMENT PRINTER), REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE 
THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN HONG KONG, GOVERNMENT 
REPORT (1966). 
 81. See generally id. 
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as a deterrent and on the mistaken idea that there were no other alternative 
means of rehabilitating offenders.
85
 This was particularly true for the 
public’s view of young offenders, who, it was felt, should be spared the 
protracted and potentially damaging experience of prison and would be 
better off with the brief pain and humiliation of caning instead;
86
 however, 
the Report acknowledged that, even in the mid 1960s, there were many 
alternative rehabilitative measures in place in Hong Kong’s criminal 
justice system.
87
 The report delved into great detail concerning the 
Training Centres and Reform Schools used to treat juvenile offenders, for 
example.
88
 The Report also made recommendations as to the further 
expansion of their use in juvenile criminal justice, and also suggested that 
efforts be made to increase the public’s awareness of these programs and 
institutions.
89
  
Interestingly, the advocacy of institutionalized discipline here over the 
use of bodily harm at the hands of the State are reminiscent of Foucault’s 
Panopticon model. It is also clear that a Foucaultian shift in the philosophy 
of punishment in Hong Kong was taking place—from a focus on 
retributive punishment to one that emphasized rehabilitative techniques—
even a full 25 years before the actual repeal of the Corporal Punishment 
Ordinance. Still, even with this belief in the public’s misinformed idea of 
the criminal justice system and the committee’s apparent belief in the 
merits of abolition, considerable deference was still given to the use of the 
cane.
90
 Although it is never explicitly stated, it could be surmised that 
authorities were not keen to enact drastic changes in the penal law, 
recognizing the somewhat precarious nature of foreign rule. Indeed, the 
political function of corporal punishment in Hong Kong was an important 
consideration for colonial rule. Authorities were not anxious to discard the 
stern hand of colonial rule expressed through corporal punishment. Indeed, 
even under the relatively stable rule of colonial Hong Kong, the political 
usefulness of judicial corporal punishment was appreciated.  
B. The Demise of Corporal Punishment in the Colony 
By the 1980s, the Government was still mulling over what to do with 
the practice of corporal punishment. In his testimony before the 
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 88. Id.  
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Legislative Council in 1984, Secretary for Security Gordon Mortimer 
reported that Government studies had shown a lack of evidence supporting 
the effectiveness of corporal punishment over alternative forms of 
punishment, as well as a decreasing frequency of its use.
91
 Mortimer went 
on to say that among those few who had experienced caning, a 
substantially higher percentage of them had re-offended than those 
offenders who had been sentenced to alternative forms of punishment.
92
 
Despite all of this, however, he concluded his testimony by saying that the 
Government would merely continue to “monitor statistics” and that he was 
“not in a position” to determine whether or not abolition was necessary.93 
Again, the prevailing perception, even in the late 1980s, remained that the 
local Chinese people required “stern but benevolent” forms of 
authoritarian rule and the Government continued with this same 
discourse.
94
  
Despite the Government’s contradictory stance on the matter, in 
practice, canings had become ever less common as the postwar decades 
went by. For juvenile criminals, figures show that in 1978, there were 1.2 
caning sentences handed down for every 100,000 juveniles sentenced, 
comprising 0.6% of the total convicted.
95
 By 1987, that number was down 
to zero.
96
 In fact, for the whole of 1987 only one adult was sentenced to 
caning, and another eight in 1988.
97
 Indeed, flogging had become 
relatively rare, and increasingly, members of the judiciary, legal 
community, and Corrections Services Department had come to dislike the 
practice, with magistrates often finding themselves faced with the difficult 
choice of either sending juveniles to prison or having them sentenced to 
caning and subsequently released afterward for certain offences.
98
 
Speaking to the Los Angeles Times in 1989, one Hong Kong lawyer said 
that “[m]agistrates loathe to send young boys to prison . . . They hate 
 
 
 91. HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS: JULY 25 1984, 
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 93. Id. at 1293. 
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 96. Id. 
 97. Daniela Deane, Use of ‘the Cane’ Lives On: In Parts of Asia, Flogging Still Exists, LA TIMES 
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caning too. But their hands are tied.”99 Additionally, with the Handover 
fast approaching, discussions within the legal community regarding the 
need for “judicial house cleaning” began to gain greater traction.100 In 
1990, when the repeal of the Corporal Punishment Ordinance was finally 
set in motion, Secretary Mortimer’s successor, Alistair Asprey, explained 
that the Courts had only used their power to award such sentences on 23 
occasions over the previous five years, with none up until that point for 
1990 alone.
101
 This is contrasted with Mortimer’s reporting of 17 for 1984, 
during his previously mentioned testimony. Asprey further testified that 
this was because the Courts considered the practice to be “unnecessary and 
outdated,” with numerous other available sentencing options “better [able 
to] achieve the penal objectives of punishment, deterrence and 
rehabilitation.”102 He went on to say in his report that the Government now 
agreed with that sentiment, and recommended the repeal of the Corporal 
Punishment Ordinance. Although he does not cite a source, he indicates 
that much of the public favored alternative methods of punishing 
criminals, marking a major shift in the colonial government’s willingness 
to capitulate to popular sentiment.
103
 Together with the formal abolition of 
capital punishment in the Colony in 1993, it could finally be said that, in 
Hong Kong, the State had released its hold on the body of the convict.
104
 
In the case of Hong Kong, we see a slow transition away from the 
spectacle of the scaffold—one marked by fits and starts, stymied by a 
lingering sense of insecurity on the part of the colonial rulers. Yet, 
notwithstanding the almost reflexive, defensive attitude of colonial rule, 
the relative socio-political stability of Hong Kong allowed for the 
transition to eventually take hold, first in practice and then in statute, with 
the complete abolition of corporal punishment in the colony. This was, 
however, markedly not the case with Singapore.  
 
 
 99. See Deane, supra note 97. 
 100. See Basler, supra note 94. 
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III. THE CASE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN SINGAPORE 
Singapore’s use of corporal punishment is also a product of its colonial 
heritage, although, unlike Hong Kong, Singapore’s legal system was 
derived not only from the British common law but also the Indian Penal 
Code. Founded by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819, Singapore did not enter 
the Empire as a Crown Colony but rather as a trading post of Raffles’ 
employer, the British East India Company, and then as one of the Straits 
Settlements, which was essentially an extension of British India, before 
finally becoming a Crown Colony in 1867.
105
 Throughout this period, the 
use of corporal punishment, particularly caning, continued to expand, but 
it is the even greater expansion of its use in the postwar era that is of 
particular note.
106
  
A. The Cold War Politics of the Cane  
Singapore traversed a very different path than Hong Kong in the 
postwar period that would have consequences for Singapore’s justice 
system, including the expanded use of corporal punishment. This 
development, however, has as much to do with the geopolitics of the era as 
it does with its colonial past. As a newly independent State in the 1960s, 
the Government of Singapore extensively employed the practice of 
caning.
107
 This can be explained by the small and weak State’s need to 
resort to the use of violence to maintain control and lend legitimacy to the 
city-state’s style of authoritarian rule. Indeed, Jothie Rajah makes that very 
argument, linking the ruling People’s Action Party’s (PAP) expansion of 
corporal punishment laws in Singapore with an explicit narrative of a 
vulnerable nation state in need of strict methods of punishment.
108
  
Set against the backdrop of then-contemporary politics, Singapore’s 
postwar use of corporal punishment was inextricably linked to legitimizing 
its rule. For example, in the same year that Hong Kong’s 1966 report on 
corporal punishment was being finalized, Singapore passed the Vandalism 
Act of 1966, among the first pieces of legislation passed after 
Independence.
109
 The Act, which for the first time made the ordinarily 
minor crime of property offences punishable by caning, is deeply rooted in 
 
 
 105. See PATE & GOULD, supra note 60, at 115. 
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the geopolitical climate in which the newly formed Republic found itself. 
Rajah cites the Act as an attempt by the rightwing, pro-capitalist PAP to 
curb the influence of the more left-leaning Barisan Sosioalis, then bent on 
disseminating anti-U.S. posters and signage as part of the leftist “Aid 
Vietnam” campaign against U.S. aggression.110 Such acts were equated 
with common acts of vandalism in public discourse. Indeed, here we can 
discern how the criminal act is merged together with the political sphere, 
and morphed into a narrative about a new nation vulnerable to outside 
threats.  
The period in which Singapore achieved Independence in 1965 was 
fraught with political and social unrest. After a turbulent split with 
Malaysia, and the Konfrontasi with Indonesia,
111
 among other things, the 
new Republic found itself faced with another threat—that of leftists and 
communists.
112
 Although the anti-communist Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew intended for Singapore to be a non-aligned State, Lee still felt 
communism to be a viable threat to the Republic, citing his ideological 
belief in the Domino Theory.
113
 Writing of his support of the US 
involvement in nearby Indochina, Lee explained,  
Singapore would be gravely threatened if South Vietnam were to 
fall into the hands of the communists, threatening Cambodia, Laos, 
and Thailand. The insurgency would spread into Malaysia, with 
serious consequences for Singapore. We could not subscribe to this 
high-minded ideology [of non-alignment] when it had serious 
consequences for our future.
114
  
Thus, with Singapore designated as a rest and recreation destination for 
American service personnel deployed to South Vietnam from 1966 
onward, the PAP attempted to keep their socialist political opponents as 
quiet as possible, and expanding the colonial-era corporal punishment 
laws was a key part of this endeavor.
115
 For Lee, hosting American 
military personnel even in small numbers (Lee notes that the 20,000 
servicemen visiting per year constituted a mere seven percent of the total 
 
 
 110. Id. at 69. 
 111. Id. at 21–22. 
 112. Id. at 67. 
 113. CHENG GUAN ANG, SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE VIETNAM WAR 25–26 (2009). The Domino 
Theory put forward the idea that if any one country was to fall to communism, then so too would its 
neighbours. 
 114. LEE KUAN YEW, FROM THIRD WORLD TO FIRST: SINGAPORE AND THE ASIAN ECONOMIC 
BOOM 412–14  (Harper Business ed., 2011) (2000). 
 115. See RAJAH, supra note 108, at 67. 
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tourist traffic into Singapore at that time) was a tacit way to support a war 
effort he viewed as vital to the national security of his country.
116
 His 
deep-seated fear of Singapore’s vulnerability to communist influence, 
entrenched in Cold War ideology, was palpable: “if America disengaged, 
the tide would go against all non-communist countries . . . [and a]fter that, 
with fraternal communist parties in control, the communists would cut our 
throats in Singapore.”117 The need of the young Singaporean government 
to convey strength took on a sense of deep urgency.  
Acts of left-wing groups like the Barisan Sosioalis, including 
distribution of pro-communist posters and slogans, were perceived as a 
clear and present danger to the nation. Rajah directly links passage of the 
Vandalism Act with the PAP’s greater overall aim of equating the party 
with the nation, thereby putting any political opposition as “anti-
national.”118 Dissent had to be dealt with using the pain and humiliation of 
punishment against the body. Speaking before Parliament, Lee explained 
the threat posed by the “vandals”:  
Flaunting the values of his ideology, he [(the vandal)] is quite 
prepared to make a martyr of himself and go to [prison] . . . But if 
he knows he is going to get three of the best, I think he will lose a 
great deal of enthusiasm, because there is little glory attached to the 
rather humiliating experience of having to be caned.”119  
This is also a clear application of what Foucault describes as “the body of 
the condemned man [becoming] the place where the vengeance of the 
sovereign [is] applied, the anchoring point for a manifestation of 
power.”120 Indeed, Singapore’s use of caning possessed an unmistakable 
political function. The purpose was not simply punishment; it was the 
physical humiliation and domination of those who opposed the regime. 
B. Asian Values: Singapore again under Siege 
Even in the post-Cold War world, Singapore’s government continued 
to perceive itself as a highly vulnerable nation needing the protection of 
strict disciplinary measures for punishment; the only difference was that 
 
 
 116. See YEW, supra note 114, at 453. 
 117. Id. at 457. 
 118. See RAJAH, supra note 108, at 80. 
 119. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, August 26 1966, in JOTHIE RAJAH, 
AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW: LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE AND LEGITIMACY IN SINGAPORE 75 
(2012). 
 120. See FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 55. 
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this time the context of political opposition was removed from the 
narrative.
121
 Nowhere was this more plainly illustrated than in the case of 
Michael Fay, an American juvenile sentenced to caning under the same 
Vandalism Act in 1994, in what was an incident that received widespread 
international attention at the the time.
122
 Here, Rajah notes a shift in the 
rhetoric employed by the Singaporean authorities in their application of 
the Vandalism Act, reframing the context into one of Asian values and 
degenerate Western morals.
123
 Speaking to the Straits Times after the 
resulting uproar from the American news media, as well as an appeal by 
US President Bill Clinton for leniency, Lee Kuan Yew, now Senior 
Minister of Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s cabinet, explained the state’s 
view of the situation proclaiming “[the United States] dares not restrain or 
punish individuals, forgiving them for whatever they’ve done . . . [which 
is] why the whole country is in chaos.”124 He explained that Singapore, by 
contrast, believed in a government that protected society for the greater 
good.
125
 He went on to say that the United States was plagued by social 
problems such as “[d]rugs, violence, unemployment and homelessness, all 
sorts of problems in its society”, making it an unsafe country without 
internal peace.
126
 Lee attributed this to the Western ideal of serving 
individual interests, rather than a focus on the group, as endorsed by 
Eastern cultures.
127
  
Crucially, the State would take this East-West clash of values as a new 
threat to the nation. A youngster from Hong Kong attending school in 
Singapore, Shiu Chi Ho, was also convicted and sentenced to caning 
during the Fay affair.
128
 In addition to placing Governor Chris Patten in the 
somewhat ironic position of asking for clemency over a form of 
punishment Hong Kong had itself only recently abolished,
129
 the State in 
Singapore sought to use the differences between Fay and Shiu to contrast 
so-called “Asian values” with Western moral decline.130 Commenting on 
 
 
 121. See RAJAH, supra note 108, at 90. 
 122. JOEL KRIEGER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS 366 (2012). 
 123. RAJAH, supra note 108, at 91. 
 124. US Reaction to Fay Case Shows It Dare Not Punish Criminals, THE STRAITS TIMES (Apr. 13, 
1994), in JOTHIE RAJAH, AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW: LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE AND LEGITIMACY 
IN SINGAPORE 105 (2012). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 104. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 91. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See RAJAH, supra note 108, at 104; Mark Hughes, Britain lodges clemency plea in caning 
case, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, (May 10, 1994), available at http://www.scmp.com/ 
article/73566/britain-lodges-clemency-plea-caning-case. 
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the matter to the press, Lee noted that Fay was the child of divorced 
parents whereas Shiu’s were not and had, in his view, expressed a properly 
Confucian embarrassment at the publicity generated by the affair and their 
son’s punishment by caning.131 The State’s perceived notions of the 
dangers presented by Western morality were perhaps best illustrated by 
comments made by Prime Minister Goh, when he described Singapore’s 
rising divorce rates, and the alleged resulting rise in single parenting, drug 
use and juvenile delinquency, as threats to the country that could be 
stopped by corporal punishment in the home and by extension, elsewhere 
in society.
132
 The belief was that maintaining corporal punishment inside 
and outside of the home, was key to preventing society from spiraling into 
moral decay.
133
 The State likened its role as punisher of convicts to that of 
a parent spanking a misbehaving child: “the punishment which would 
normally be meted out to children can now be meted out to the adult 
delinquents actually responsible.”134 In effect, the public and domestic 
spheres were merged into a single entity. This insistence that the family, as 
a societal institution, be used to help keep society in check, is captured in 
Foucault’s model.  
Lee Kuan Yew also stressed the importance of avoiding the appearance 
of treating Fay differently due to his status as a foreign national: “if we did 
not cane this boy because he was American, how could we cane our own 
offenders?”135 Indeed, the concurrent public discourse on the Fay affair, as 
reported in the press, also emphasized the importance of treating these 
foreign offenders “like any Singaporean offender.”136 The feedback from 
readers, presented by the newspapers, showed an overwhelming support 
for the State’s handling of the situation, which Rajah describes as a 
“discourse [that] constructed a public demand for ‘justice’a ‘justice’ that 
involved subjecting the ‘foreigners’ to severe punishment.”137 This display 
of public support, in turn, can be seen as a constructed attempt at showing 
popular local consent for citizens to be subject to this type of retributive 
 
 
 131. Weng Kam Leong, Biggest Crisis Has Brought Family Even Closer, THE STRAITS TIMES 
(Aug. 7, 1994), in JOTHIE RAJAH, AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW: LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE AND 
LEGITIMACY IN SINGAPORE 106 (2012). 
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 134. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 26 August 1966, in JOTHIE RAJAH, 
AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW: LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE AND LEGITIMACY IN SINGAPORE 77 
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punishment, essentially legitimizing State subjugation.
138
 In effect, the 
perception of a vulnerable nation in need of the strong guiding hand of the 
State, originally set against the Cold War backdrop, reasserted itself— this 
time framed in a clash of Eastern and Western values. Once again, 
Singapore felt besieged—this time in the form of a cultural threat.  
Today, Singapore continues to employ judicial caning with great 
frequency. In 1993, the year before the Fay affair, Singapore courts 
ordered a total of 3,244 caning sentences;
139
 by 2007, that figure had 
rocketed to 6,404.
140
 The figures have since decreased in the years since, 
but the numbers still remain very high, with 2,318 ordered in 2011.
141
 
Unlike the rights-conscious and more Western-influenced Hong Kong, it 
is perhaps unlikely that Singapore will be repealing its laws on corporal 
punishment in the near future, particularly given the government’s strong 
advocacy of what it sees as Asian values.
142
 Pate and Gould explain that 
such shared values have ensured the survival of corporal punishment in 
Singapore, citing the Government-published Shared Values White Paper 
of 1991,
143
 which indicates that Singapore’s understanding of human rights 
is viewed through a lens of “[n]ation before community and society above 
self: Putting the interests of society ahead of the individual.”144 In contrast, 
Hong Kong’s ratification of human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR, and 
ICESCR, in the 1990s, show a much more Western-oriented view of 
human rights. Singapore is party to neither treaty.
145
 Both judicial corporal 
punishment and judicial execution are legal in Singapore.
146
 The 
divergence between the two former Crown Colonies in this area is likely 
to remain for some time, ensuring that the State will continue to retain a 
hold on the body of the convict in Singapore.   
 
 
 138. Id.  
 139. US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SINGAPORE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994 (1995) at 3/14.  
 140. US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2007 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: 
SINGAPORE (2008). 
 141. US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS: SINGAPORE (2012). 
 142. See PATE & GOULD supra note 60, at 116. 
 143. Shared Values, White Paper. 2 Jan 1991. 
 144. See PATE & GOULD supra note 60, at 116. 
 145. Roland Rich, An Appreciation of the Human Rights Situation in Southeast Asia, in THE 
CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 173 (Aurel Croissant & Marco Bunte eds 
2011). 
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IV. EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS: THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE 
SCAFFOLD IS ALIVE 
A. Hong Kong and Singapore may be Distinguished in Terms of Political 
Insecurity 
The divergent experiences of Hong Kong and Singapore can be 
distinguished in terms of the perceived vulnerability of their governments’ 
rule. The more a government’s rule is threatened, the more that 
government will be inclined to employ shock punishment as a way to 
bolster their authority. In the case of both Hong Kong and Singapore, the 
potential frailty of foreign rule helped drive policymakers to employ both 
corporal and capital punishment if only for the strong messaging 
component these forms of punishment possess. However, the disparity 
between the two colonies in terms of political stability eventually caused 
Hong Kong to abolish all forms of shock punishment and Singapore to 
maintain it well beyond its independence from Great Britain. While Hong 
Kong was not without its incidences of social unrest, the colonial 
government in Hong Kong did not feel their rule challenged to the same 
extent as the newly independent government in Singapore. The result was 
two divergent stories in their respective use of shock punishment.  
The independent government in Singapore saw a need for corporal 
punishment as a means of shoring up their rule, first as a new, vulnerable 
State besieged by external political threats, then later as one in danger of 
decline by way of corrupting foreign morals. Unlike Hong Kong, which 
enjoyed relative stability during the postwar period, this era saw the newly 
independent Singapore largely left to fend for itself in the highly polarized 
geopolitical climate of the Cold War. Faced with what it perceived to be a 
palpable threat to national security, the State saw the fledgling Republic as 
a vulnerable new nation in need of strict laws to protect itself from a 
communist takeover. Decades later, by the time of the Michael Fay 
incident, the nature of the threat shifted, but, in principle, remained the 
same in terms of fueling the authorities’ inclination to employ severe, 
retributive punishment. The Cold War had ended, but moral threats to the 
nation and ultimately to the government’s authority remained, and the 
State sought to bolster its image as a bulwark of Asian values in the face 
of encroaching moral degeneracy from the West. This illustrates that it 
was largely ideological forces that has driven the retention of corporal 
punishment in Singapore well into the 21st century. Crucially, it was 
ideology rooted in the ongoing political insecurity of the State. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/5
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Hong Kong, while certainly not without its share of social problems, 
nevertheless had the comparative luxury of relative stability, which 
enabled its government and judiciary to cautiously embrace a more 
rehabilitative, rights-oriented penal philosophy. As foreign rulers, the 
British administration in Hong Kong ensured a steady import of Western 
liberal ideas, especially those related to rights and concepts of justice. The 
British authorities were also inclined to adopt a measure of pragmatism, 
and implement penal reform in a gradualist manner. The Hong Kong 
Government’s official justification for the continued use of caning well 
into the 1980s was that Hong Kong’s predominantly Chinese population 
would never settle for anything less than corporal punishment for the 
relevant offences, and that simple jail time would not be an ineffective 
deterrent, however mistaken the Government felt that sentiment was. 
Indeed, this would prove to be the sole, stubbornly entrenched justification 
for retaining corporal punishment in the Colony, long after all other 
justifications, such as its deterrence and the value of retribution, had lost 
considerable credibility. There was, however, a political subtext to this 
justification: corporal punishment was a means to highlight the stern hand 
with which the colonial masters ruled its colony.  
Equally important were the wider political considerations of the period. 
With the transfer of sovereignty fast approaching, it became apparent that 
the British Government was keen to accelerate the application of 
international discourse on the Western concept of human rights to Hong 
Kong and conduct “judicial house cleaning.”147 The story of corporal 
punishment in postwar Hong Kong can be characterized by a steady, if 
delayed, application of the progressive shifts Europe had experienced over 
the past century, especially in the time following the end of World War II.  
Key to this gradual shift away from corporal punishment was the 
relative social and political stability that Hong Kong enjoyed as a British 
colony. However, the vulnerability of colonial rule was never absent from 
consideration. In Hong Kong’s postwar era, Colonial authorities retained 
corporal punishment largely as a result of a struggle to balance Western 
concepts of human rights and justice with a pragmatic desire to not 
undermine their rule. Underlying this struggle was the political function of 
punishment as an instrument to project the power of colonial rule. This 
considerably slowed the process of abolition. Corporal punishment was 
used extensively in the British colonies largely because such visceral 
forms of punishment are potent expressions of power that colonial rulers 
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were eager to project; however, because Hong Kong enjoyed a relatively 
stable socio-political atmosphere, retention did eventually give way to 
abolition. The Singaporean experience is starkly different. Singapore’s 
authorities used corporal punishment far more resolutely as a means of 
protecting the legitimacy of its rule against its perceived vulnerability as a 
newly-formed nation. The underlying difference between Hong Kong’s 
experience and that of Singapore is one of political and social stability. 
Under the colonial protection of British rule and the stability it afforded, 
while the process was slow, Hong Kong eventually abolished both 
corporal and capital punishment; under embattled independent rule, 
Singapore retained and even stepped up its use. 
Singapore is an example of a penal system that has not fully 
transitioned to a carceral culture. Vestiges of the scaffold remain in the 
form of shock punishment where the power of the State is still displayed 
directly upon the body of the offender. While caning is carried out within 
the prison, its efficacy as a primal expression of authority remains, if 
slightly muted. Singaporeans are well aware that corporal punishment is 
delivered with the blows of a rattan cane and executions carried out by 
hanging behind the walls of the prison. Singapore is a fascinating case as it 
is perhaps the most economically developed State of significant size that 
still employs corporal punishment. Indeed, the theory referenced in the 
introduction that economic development spurs a penal transition away 
from shock punishment does not seem to apply very well to the case of 
Singapore. The remainder of the Article will present empirical data 
regarding the global use of judicial corporal and capital punishment in 
relation to the political and social freedom of the societies that retain it. 
While not without anomalies, the data shows a fairly robust correlation 
between the authoritarian character of a country and the use of shock 
punishment. This seems to support our thesis. 
B. The Global Use of Judicial Corporal Punishment 
Judicial corporal punishment is a quintessential expression of State 
power in that it is the act of physical domination over the individual. Fines 
and imprisonment communicate a similar message; however, the visceral 
shock value of physical violence is unrivaled as a medium through which 
to underscore the authority of the State. As such, the use of corporeal 
punishment tends to linger in modern States whose political authority is 
less robust and vulnerable to challenge. While the legitimacy of 
Democratic governments is not as open to dispute on this front, the 
political legitimacy of non-democratic, one-party-rule States is not as 
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secure. Indeed, it is for this reason that authoritarian, and semi-
authoritarian regimes work hard at shoring up the legitimacy of their rule 
through appeals to patriotism, historical claim, religious divine right, 
external threats, or political ideology. Shock punishment as a conduit 
through which to express the power of the State is but another tool in the 
toolkit of such States to cultivate the perception of political strength. A 
look at the States that retain corporal punishment supports this claim. The 
majority of countries that employ corporal punishment lack a substantial 
degree of political and social freedom. 
Below is a tabulated list of countries that have not abolished corporal 
punishment as a penal sentence.
148
 The form of the corporal punishment as 
well as the venue is also listed. The term “flogging” here is used as an 
umbrella term that may include a range of instruments, such as: whip; 
strap; cane; birch; cat o’ nine tails; rattan; or rod. The degree of political 
freedom of each country is also shown. This rating is taken from Freedom 
House’s annual report.149 Countries are rated on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 
representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom. Nations are 
then classified as “Free”, “Partly Free”, or “Not Free.” The designations 
correspond to the rating in the following manner: “Free” (1.0-2.5), “Partly 
Free” (2.51-5.5), or “Not Free” (5.51-7.0). Countries highlighted in grey 
are considered fully-free States (i.e. a perfect rating of one). 
TABLE 1: STATE PUNISHMENT VENUE AND FREEDOM RATING 
Afghanistan flogging/amputation public / private 6 
Antigua and Barbuda Flogging n/a 2 
Barbados Flogging Private 1 
Botswana Flogging Private 2.5 
Brunei Flogging n/a 5.5 
Burma  Flogging n/a 5.5 
Dominica Flogging Private 1 
Eritrea** Flogging n/a 7 
Grenada Flogging n/a 1.5 
Guyana Flogging Private 2.5 
Iran flogging/amputation public / private 6 
 
 
 148. This is based on data current as of summer 2014, and is provided by the GLOBAL INITIATIVE 
TO END ALL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN, available at http://www.endcorporalpunishment. 
org/pages/frame.html. 
 149. At arriving at the number, we have averaged together the two parameters Freedom House 
uses—political rights and civil liberties. See Freedom in the World 2014, FREEDOM HOUSE, available 
at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014. 
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Libya flogging/amputation n/a 4.5 
Malaysia Flogging Private 4 
Maldives Flogging n/a 4.5 
Mauritania flogging/amputation n/a 5.5 
Nigeria Flogging public / private 4 
Pakistan Flogging n/a 4.5 
Qatar flogging/amputation n/a 5.5 
Saint Kitts and Nevis Flogging Private 1 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Flogging Private 1 
Saudi Arabia flogging/amputation public / private 7 
Singapore Flogging Private 4 
Somalia flogging/amputation public/private 7 
Sudan Amputation/wounding n/a 3 
Tanzania Flogging Private 7 
Tonga Flogging n/a 2 
Trinidad and Tobago Flogging Private 2 
Tuvalu Flogging n/a 1 
United Arab Emirates Flogging public / private 6 
Yemen flogging/amputation n/a 6 
Zimbabwe Flogging Private 5.5 
 It is unclear if Penal Code 1957, which stipulates that young offenders may be caned, has been 
repealed. 
** There is no provision for corporal punishment in the Penal Code; however, it appears that 
provisions for whipping have yet to be repealed from the Criminal Procedure Code (article 392), the 
Whipping Act and the Citizenship Act. 
 
Out of the thirty-one countries that have not abolished corporal 
punishment, twenty-six (83.8%) are not considered fully-free States. Only 
five (16.1%) are categorized as fully-free societies. With regard to the 
eleven States that retain corporal punishment as a form of sentencing that 
are regarded as free (not necessarily fully free), it is unclear to what extent 
corporal punishment is actually applied in practice. Actual application 
almost certainly varies significantly between national penal systems. In 
some cases, it may be a matter of a law remaining “on the books” but in 
practice rarely if ever employed. Unfortunately, this data is not available 
in any comprehensive manner for corporal punishment. This is because 
there is a paucity of scholarship of a comparative nature regarding the 
precise use of corporal punishment.
150
 We speculate that there is almost 
certainly a marked difference between the frequency of its application in 
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran to that of tiny island-states in the 
Caribbean such as Antigua and Barbuda and Saint Kitts and Nevis where 
 
 
 150. NIGEL RODLEY & MATT POLLARD, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 427 (2009). 
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its inclusion in the penal code is likely more a function of colonial 
inheritance than a robust, modern penal practice. Moreover, the range of 
offenses subject to judicial corporal punishment also varies between 
States. Saudi Arabia is of particular note in that there is in fact no written 
Penal Code and courts wield tremendous discretion as to what crimes are 
punishable by corporal punishment.
151
 In any case, it is difficult to assess 
these claims without access to more detailed empirical data. What is clear 
is that a sizeable majority of countries that employ corporal punishment 
share a common feature—they are not fully-free States, and most are 
authoritarian regimes, or illiberal democracies such as Singapore.
152
 
C. The Global Use of Judicial Execution  
While it is difficult to get precise data with regards to the global use of 
judicial corporal punishment, such data is readily available for judicial 
execution; a far richer pool of empirical research is available regarding the 
death penalty. Indeed, in the case of the death penalty, a pattern emerges 
with reference to authoritarian regimes and their use of execution that 
supports our thesis.  
Below is a list of all States that currently retain the death penalty for 
ordinary crimes.
153
 States considered fully free are highlighted in grey. 
TABLE 2: STATE FREEDOM RATING 
Afghanistan 6 
Antigua and Barbuda 2 
Bahamas 1 
Bahrain 6 
Bangladesh 3.5 
Barbados 1 
Belarus 6.5 
Belize 1.5 
Botswana 2.5 
Chad 6.5 
China 6.5 
Comoros 3.5 
 
 
 151. PETER O. NWANKWO, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 158 (2011). 
 152. An illiberal democracy is a governing system that, while affording the right to vote to its 
citizens, severely curtails civil liberties. See Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 22–43 (1997).  
 153. See Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries#retentionist. This data 
is current as of summer 2014. 
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Cuba 6.5 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 2.5 
Dominica 1 
Egypt 5.5 
Equatorial Guinea 7 
Ethiopia 6 
Gambia 6 
Guatemala 3.5 
Guinea 5 
Guyana 2.5 
India 2.5 
Indonesia 3 
Iran 6 
Iraq 5.5 
Jamaica 2.5 
Japan 1 
Jordan 5.5 
Kuwait 4.5 
Lebanon 4.5 
Lesotho 2.5 
Libya 4.5 
Malaysia 4 
Nigeria 4 
North Korea 7 
Oman 5.5 
Pakistan 4.5 
Qatar 5.5 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 1 
Saint Lucia 1 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1 
Saudi Arabia 7 
Singapore 4 
Somalia 7 
South Sudan 6 
Sudan 7 
Syria 7 
Thailand 4 
Trinidad And Tobago 2 
Uganda 5 
United Arab Emirates 6 
United States of America 1 
Viet Nam 6 
Yemen 6 
Zimbabwe 5.5 
 
Out of the fifty-six countries that currently retain the death penalty for 
ordinary crimes, forty-eight (85.7%) are considered as not fully-free 
societies. Our contention is that the theatre of punishment is just one 
contributing factor for retention, but in many cases a significant one. Other 
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factors may explain the eight fully-free societies (14.2%) that retain 
judicial execution. What the data shows, however, is that a fairly robust 
correlation exists between how unfree a State is and the likelihood that 
they will employ the death penalty. It should be noted that this distribution 
diverges significantly from the global distribution of freedom rankings for 
all countries. 
A comparison of the general global distribution of freedom versus 
freedom rating in relation to legality of death penalty. 
TABLE 3: STATUS OF SOCIETY AND GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF EXECUTING STATES 
Fully-free societies 33.5% 14.2% 
Not fully-free societies 74.8% 85.7% 
As of 2014, out of the 195 counties rated from Freedom house, 146 
(74.8%) are not considered fully-free societies, and forty-nine (33.5%) are 
considered fully-free societies.
154
 The correlation between the freedom 
rating of States and their actual use of execution is also clear from the 
data, as seen in the table below. 
Below is a list of States that performed executions between 2007 and 
2011 showing the actual number of executions carried out.
 155
 Each 
country’s freedom rating from Freedom House is also shown. States 
considered as fully free (i.e. a rating of one) are highlighted in grey. 
TABLE 4: STATE EXECUTIONS AND FREEDOM RATING 
China  Thousands (unclear) 6.5 
Iran 1,663 6 
Saudi Arabia 423 7 
Iraq 256 6 
United States 220 1 
Pakistan 171 4.5 
Yemen 152 6 
Korea (North) 105 7 
Vietnam 58 6 
Libya 39 4.5 
Afghanistan 34 6 
Japan 33 1 
 
 
 154. This covers the period from January 1 through December 31, 2013. Freedom in the World 
2014, supra note 149. 
 155. See “The Death Penalty”, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, available at https://www.amnesty.org/ 
en/what-we-do/death-penalty/.  
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Syria 33 7 
Sudan 30 7 
Bangladesh 28 3.5 
Somalia 23 7 
Egypt 12 5 
Indonesia 11 2.5 
Belarus 9 6.5 
Equatorial Guinea 7 7 
Sudan (South) 5 5.5 
Botswana 4 2.5 
Oman 4 5.5 
Singapore 4 4 
Bahrain 2 6 
Malaysia 2 4 
Thailand 2 4 
UAE 2 6 
Ethiopia 1 6 
Kuwait 1 5 
Mongolia 1 1.5 
Saint Kitts & Nevis 1 1 
* This data is current as of summer 2014. Note that Taiwan, which has judicial execution, is not 
included here. Similarly, the Palestinian Authority, also an executioner, is absent from this list. 
Although these countries retain corporal punishment, they really vary 
in how frequently they use it. Out of the thirty-two countries that actually 
performed executions between 2007 and 2011 only three (9.3%) are 
considered fully-free societies. Twenty-nine (90.6%) are considered to not 
be fully free. Twenty-seven (84.3%) of the thirty-two are either “not free” 
or only “partly free” with the solid majority being of those countries being 
“not free” (76.9%). Among the top ten most prolific executioners, 90% are 
“not free” societies. Seven of the countries on this list are “unfree.” The 
only anomaly is the United States, and indeed its inclusion here is curious 
and one often remarked upon. It speaks to the fact that there is a 
multiplicity of factors that contribute to the use of shock punishment. The 
issue of political legitimacy and the need to communicate authority is but 
one fact; however, the fairly robust correlation between unfree States and 
use of shock punishment suggests it is a nontrivial factor. It is important, 
however, that we consider these numbers in relation to size of population: 
a State with a population of 100,000,000 carrying out one execution and a 
State with a population of 100,000 carrying out one execution are simply 
not comparable. This is taken into account in the table below, which 
adjusts the ranking on a per capita basis. 
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Below is a list of the top ten most prolific executioners adjusted on a 
per-capita basis.
156
 Note that in the case of China, the number of 
executions is unclear, as this number is classified and not released. We 
have used the number of 10,000 based on an estimate of 2,000 executions 
over a five year period (2007–2011); however, the reader should note that 
this is only conjecture. Some China watchers speculate that the number 
may be significantly higher; Amnesty international claims that thousands 
were executed in 2013 alone.
157
 States considered fully free are 
highlighted in grey. 
TABLE 5: STATE EXECUTIONS PER CAPITA AND FREEDOM RATING 
Iran 1,663 48,611 6 
Saint Kitts & Nevis 1 51,538 1 
Saudi Arabia 423 64,647 7 
Equatorial Guinea 7 103,179 7 
Iraq 256 127,287 6 
China 10,000 136,602 6.5 
Libya 39 160,107 4.5 
Yemen 152 171,401 6 
Korea (North) 105 236,682 7 
Somalia 23 453,393 7 
When the list is adjusted on a per-capita basis, the ranking changes; 
however the ratio remains the same: nine of the top ten executioners are 
unfree States. All of the top ten executioners save Saint Kitts & Nevis are 
unfree States with a ranking of six or higher. Eight of the nine unfree 
States have designations of “not free”, the highest possible designation of 
unfree. The inclusion of Saint Kitts & Nevis here is slightly misleading. 
Because of its extraordinarily tiny population (51,538) having carried out 
only one execution between 2007 and 2011, it nevertheless ranks second 
highest on the list. Compare this to Saudi Arabia ranked immediately 
below it: it is estimated that, between 2007 and 2011, Saudi Arabia 
executed 423 offenders. Saint Kitts & Nevi is in fact the eighth smallest 
country in the world by population.
158
 As such, a case could be made that 
Saint Kitts & Nevis should be treated as an outlier and its inclusion here 
 
 
 156. Calculations are based upon 2014 populations according to the CIA WORLD FACT BOOK. 
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.  
 157. Annual Report: China 2013, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (May 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-china-2013. 
 158. This is according to the 2013 World Population Data Sheet, POPULATION REFERENCE 
BUREAU, available at http://www.prb.org/pdf13/2013-population-data-sheet_eng.pdf. 
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distorts the data. Yet notwithstanding this, the correlation between the use 
of judicial execution and the political and civil freedom of a country is 
unmistakable. It should also be noted that if this data extended back to 
include the 1990s when Singapore was executing in far larger numbers, 
with a population from 3 to 4 million (within that period), Singapore 
would most assuredly be in this top ten when adjusted per capita. Between 
1991 and 2001, Singapore executed 322 offenders.
159
 In 2004, Amnesty 
International stated that it believed Singapore “to have the world’s highest 
per capita execution rate, relative to its population.”160 Another interesting 
finding is that there is a robust correlation between States that have 
recently abolished the death penalty for all crimes and a movement in 
those States towards greater societal freedom, as seen in the following 
table. 
Below is a list of countries that abolished the death penalty for all 
crimes. Following information is shown: year of abolishment; freedom 
rating in 1980; and freedom rating in 2014.
161
 
TABLE 6: ABOLITION AND FREEDOM RATING (1980–2014) 
Armenia 2003 6 4.5 
Turkey 2004 5 3.5 
Senegal 2004 4 2 
Samoa 2004 4 2 
Greece 2004 1 2 
Bhutan  2004 5 3.5 
Mexico 2005 3 3 
Philippines 2005 5 3 
Rwanda 2006 6 5.5 
Kyrgyzstan 2007 6 5 
Albania 2007 7 3 
Uzbekistan 2008 6 7 
Argentina 2008 6 2 
Bolivia 2009 7 3 
Burundi 2009 7 5 
Togo 2009 7 4 
Gabon 2010 6 5.5 
Latvia 2012 6 2 
 
 
 159. Singapore: The Death Penalty—A Hidden Toll of Executions, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 
Jan. 15, 2004, at 6, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA36/001/2004. 
 160. Id. at 5.  
 161. The data regarding abolition is current as of summer 2014 and based upon data provided by 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. See http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-
countries#retentionist. The data regarding freedom rating was based upon Freedom House’s annual 
reports for those respective years. See Freedom in the World 2014, supra note 149.  
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Out of the eighteen counties that abolished the death penalty for all 
crimes in the last decade, sixteen (88.8%) show a clear progression 
towards a more free society when their current freedom rating is compared 
to their freedom rating in 1980. Only two (11.1%), Greece and 
Uzbekistan, have become less free; however, it should be noted that this 
was by a degree of one rank in both cases. The States that became freer 
show an improvement of two to four rankings. All told, this data shows a 
strong correlation between movement towards a more free society and 
abolition of execution, but these are just the States that abolished judicial 
execution (for ordinary crimes) in the last decade. The picture becomes 
clearer when we exclusively look at a complete list of the States 
considered most unfree. From it, a robust correlation between societal 
freedom and the legality of shock punishment becomes evident as shown 
in the table below. 
Below is a list of all countries designated by Freedom House as “not 
free” with a rating of seven (a rating of seven is most unfree). The list 
indicates the legality of judicial corporal punishment and execution. States 
employing neither corporal punishment nor execution are highlighted in 
grey. 
TABLE 7: STATE CORPORAL EXECUTION AND FREEDOM RATING 
Saudi Arabia Yes  Yes  7 
Somalia  Yes  Yes  7 
North Korea Yes Yes  7 
Saudi Arabia Yes Yes  7 
Eritrea Yes Yes  7 
Central African Republic No  Yes 7 
Equatorial Guinea No  Yes  7 
North Korea No  Yes  7 
Sudan Yes Yes  7 
Syria No  Yes  7 
Turkmenistan No  No 7 
Uzbekistan  No  No  7 
 Amnesty International reports that the last confirmed execution was carried out in 1989. See 
Amnesty International, Death Penalty: Countries Abolitionist in Practice, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/countries-abolitionist-in-practice, last accessed Feb. 25, 
2014. However, there is indication that at least one execution may have been carried out between 1999 
and 2008. See Luwam Dirar, former advisor to the Minister of Justice of Eritrea, Interview with DPW, 
DPW Eritrea Doc. I-1, June 20, 2014. 
Out of the twelve counties rated as most unfree, ten (83.3%) employ at 
least execution if not execution and corporal punishment. The fact that 
such a disproportionate number of unfree States consistently employ shock 
punishment tells us that these forms of punishment hold a special appeal to 
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such States. The data shows a robust correlation between the use of shock 
punishment and States that are unfree. This supports our thesis. It is worth 
reiterating that our contention is not that all States that employ shock 
punishment are unfree; rather, our point here is that a high proportion of 
unfree States employ shock punishment. The correlation between how free 
a society is (and therefore how legitimized its government is) and its 
tendency to employ shock punishment is also clear by virtue of its relative 
absence when we look at societies assigned the highest rating of free (a 
rating of one). An inverse correlation appears when we examine States that 
are rated as fully free, as shown in the table below. 
Below is a list of all countries designated by Freedom House as fully 
free (a rating of one is most free). All are electoral democracies. The list 
indicates the legality of judicial corporal punishment and execution. States 
employing corporal punishment and/or execution are highlighted in grey. 
TABLE 8: STATE CORPORAL EXECUTION AND FREEDOM RATING 
Andorra No No  1 
Australia No No 1 
Austria No No 1 
Bahamas No Yes  1 
Barbados Yes Sentenced 1 
Belgium No No 1 
Canada No No 1 
Cape Verde No No 1 
Chile No No 1 
Costa Rica No No 1 
Cyprus No No 1 
Czech Republic No No 1 
Denmark  No No 1 
Dominica Yes No 1 
Estonia No No 1 
Finland No No 1 
France No No 1 
Germany No No 1 
Iceland No No 1 
Ireland No No 1 
Italy No No 1 
Japan No Yes 1 
Kiribati  No No 1 
Liechtenstein No No 1 
Lithuania  No No 1 
Luxemburg No No 1 
Malta No No 1 
Marshal Islands No No 1 
Micronesia No No 1 
Nauru No No 1 
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Netherlands No No 1 
New Zealand No No 1 
Norway No No 1 
Palau No No 1 
Poland No No 1 
Portugal No No 1 
Saint Kitts and Nevis Yes Yes 1 
Saint Lucia No Sentenced 1 
Saint Vincent and 
Grenadines 
Yes Sentenced 1 
San Marino No No  1 
Slovakia No No 1 
Slovenia No No 1 
Spain No No 1 
Sweden No No 1 
Switzerland No No 1 
Tuvalu Yes No 1 
United Kingdom No No 1 
United States No Yes 1 
Uruguay No No 1 
Out of the forty-nine countries rated as fully free by freedom house 
(these are all the States with a rating of one), forty (81.6%) do not employ 
either judicial corporal punishment or execution. Interestingly, this is 
comparable to the percentage (83.3%) of countries rated as most unfree 
that employ either judicial corporal punishment or execution, or both. 
From among the nine countries that do utilize shock punishment, only 
three (6.1%) employ both corporal and capital punishment, and from 
among these three, only one (Saint Kitts and Nevis) actually carried out an 
execution. That there are free societies that employ shock punishment 
indicates that there are other factors that contribute to retention. Likewise, 
there are a variety of factors that may contribute to abolition. For example, 
Cambodia and Rwanda, both unfree states with an identical freedom house 
rating of 5.5, have abolished judicial execution. This is very likely 
attributable to the horrific genocides that both these countries endured in 
recent history; however, notwithstanding these other factors, a robust 
correlation seems to exist between the political freedom of a State and use 
of shock punishment. Of course, correlation is not causation, but the 
consistency of this finding provides a substantial degree of credence to the 
thesis that the political function of shock punishment plays a role in its 
retention. While this correlation has been noted by others, a precise theory 
as to its cause with reference to the semiotics of shock punishment has not 
been coherently articulated.  
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CONCLUSION 
Punishment may serve a variety of functions, but its ability to 
communicate power is unmistakable. Using Hong Kong and Singapore as 
case studies, we attempted to explain the continued use of corporal 
punishment, arguing that the expressive power of shock punishment 
makes it appealing to States coping with political insecurity. While 
governments that feel their authority threatened are less inclined to give up 
these forms of punishment, a liberal democracy, more secure in its 
authority, simply has no need for shock punishment, and so we see a 
correlation between political legitimacy and the use of shock punishment. 
For Hong Kong, Foucault’s model of penal transition applies in a fairly 
straightforward manner, although the changes Foucault describes merely 
took a longer time to fully form than they did in Europe, or even in 
Britain. So long as corporal punishment remained, the colonial 
government had at its disposal an inelegant yet effective means to 
communicate its authority. Yet, because of its relative social and political 
stability, ultimately, the trajectory of corporal punishment in Hong Kong 
followed a similar abolitionist path to that of Western nations. Singapore, 
however, is a different story. It seems the State is not yet ready to discard 
the expressive power of shock punishment and this is likely to remain the 
case for the foreseeable future.  
There are of course many factors that contribute to the retention of 
shock punishment and this paper does not deny their import; however, the 
theatre of punishment helps explain why shock punishment persists in 
many penal systems. Empirical data regarding the use of shock 
punishment shows a robust correlation between its use and the political 
freedom (and therefore legitimacy) of retentionist States. The vast majority 
of unfree States employ shock punishment. Indeed, there are only a 
handful of countries that are considered “not free” that do not employ 
either corporal or capital punishment, or both. Thus, the data suggests that, 
while many factors undoubtedly contribute to the retention of shock 
punishment, the political function of shock punishment often plays a 
significant role in its retention. Indeed, while the brutality of torture and 
public execution has largely receded into the recesses of history, the 
political function of the scaffold remains very much alive.  
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/5
